Dynamic Inspection of Public Protection in Yorkshire and the Humber
Chief Inspector’s judgement (Back to top)
This dynamic inspection of public protection work in the Yorkshire and the Humber region found that strategic action to address some of the areas identified in our previous inspection was beginning to drive improvement. Although further progress was still required for the service to meet expected standards, our case sample showed that the quality of work across all elements of assessment, planning, implementation and delivery, and reviewing (ASPIRE model) had improved, especially in planning, which had benefited from better regional quality assurance and targeted training.
Leaders acknowledged that repeated changes of regional probation directors (RPD) over the last two years had disrupted strategic direction and stability. They recognised the need for a measured and consistent approach across the organisation, ensuring that the service’s cultural identity is clearly aligned with individual and collective accountability for delivering high-quality public protection practice.
In some probation delivery units (PDUs), workforce pressures remained a significant challenge. While the national workload measurement tool suggested that staffing was adequate, local data revealed serious shortages, particularly at probation officer (PO) grade. National mechanisms such as the prioritisation framework had been unavailable to the region due to the required criteria, despite a 19 per cent vacancy rate among PO grade staff. Encouragingly there were signs of increasing stability – however, longstanding issues with vacancies, sickness and attrition, combined with high levels of practitioner and middle manager inexperience, continued to undermine capacity and confidence.
Long delays in vetting, concerns about pay, and excessive workloads also affected staff retention and undermined efforts to improve stability. Leaders felt that national recruitment campaigns had not properly reflected the public protection responsibilities of the role, and that as a result, new staff were not ready to take on these challenges.
Inspectors noted a decline in cultural and professional identity, especially among staff at probation services officer (PSO) grade, who often lacked the training, skills and confidence required to manage complex risk. In Yorkshire and the Humber, the training and development offer for PSO staff extended beyond the standard training requirements. However, constant organisational change, driven by change in national policies, and crisis-driven working, meant that staff were encouraged to focus on transactional tasks rather than reflective, analytical decision-making. Consequently, there was limited capacity to embed learning and drive improvements in practice, which reinforced these difficulties.
Management oversight was inconsistent. Inexperienced probation practitioners and middle managers were not always identifying or addressing public protection issues. Leaders recognised the need to strengthen both capability and capacity at this level.
Access to critical risk information from partners had improved through co-location and better systems. However, practitioners still faced delays and received incomplete information. Leaders stressed that national action was required to fully resolve this.
The region had successfully prioritised outstanding reviews of Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) Level 1 cases, significantly reducing the backlog. However, MAPPA approaches varied across the region, which created inconsistencies in resourcing, timeliness and partner engagement. Practitioners had a limited understanding of MAPPA, which contributed to an over-reliance on it for risk-related decision-making.
Leaders had taken steps to address gaps between probation and prison offender managers (POMs) through mentoring, new assessment tools, and opportunities for reflective peer supervision. We saw improvements in resettlement cases during our inspection fieldwork. The number of victim teams was expanded from two to five to improve visibility and service delivery.
A reoccurring issue was ‘silo’ working. High workloads, constant change and low capacity left sentence management teams disconnected from other parts of the service that could support risk management. Inspectors found that the delivery of interventions and services targeted at addressing risk were insufficient. To continue improving public protection outcomes, it was essential for leaders to strengthen practitioners’ skills and confidence, and to ensure there was meaningful management oversight and consistent delivery of interventions.
Context (Back to top)
We inspected the quality of public protection work across the Yorkshire and the Humber region. In total, 90 cases that commenced between 28 July 2025 and 08 August 2025 were inspected, focusing specifically on the delivery of public protection activity to keep people safe. Case inspections examined assessment, planning, implementation and delivery and reviewing activity, focusing on effective public protection practice. Inspectors also considered the efficacy of the region’s organisational arrangements, including multi-agency work and the use of restrictive and rehabilitative actions to support risk management.
The majority of cases we inspected involved White men aged between 25 and 55, with violence and sexual offending the most prevalent offence types. Just under a third of the inspected cases were subject to MAPPA, compared with 37 per cent of the supervised cohort regionally. Additionally, in 71 per cent of inspected cases there were concerns relating to domestic abuse, and in 82 per cent of inspected cases there were concerns regarding risk to children. This further demonstrated the significant level of demand within the region, which required coordinated and sustained multi‑agency oversight.
Yorkshire and the Humber is the second largest probation region, after London. It operates across a complex multi-agency landscape that includes both dispersed rural communities and major urban centres. The region delivers services across 11 probation delivery units and spans four police force areas and 21 local authorities. It is further supported by three integrated care boards (Humber and North Yorkshire, West Yorkshire and South Yorkshire), alongside 20 courts, 13 approved premises and 15 prisons, including two long-term and high-security establishments.
At the time of this inspection, the Yorkshire and the Humber region had 2,242 staff in post, representing 89 per cent of its overall target staffing level. Staff were responsible for managing 23,573 people on probation. This included approximately 17,660 individuals in the community, made up of those subject to community sentences and those supervised on licence. A further 5,913 were serving custodial sentences. Although staffing numbers were improving, significant gaps, most notably a 19 per cent vacancy rate at PO grade remained.
Inspection commentary (Back to top)
This inspection followed a recent core inspection of the region, published in February 2025. The region’s response to previous HM Inspectorate of Probation recommendations was beginning to have an impact. Changes included the roll-out of quality improvement workshops focusing on professional curiosity, risk, domestic abuse and safeguarding, alongside work to improve access to critical risk information. However, these changes remained in their infancy and had yet to be embedded fully into practice. Longstanding issues continued to affect the quality and consistency of public protection work. These included workforce instability, the high vacancy rate, and the pace and scale of organisational change, which staff found overwhelming. Shortfalls in practice remained evident across our findings, and, notwithstanding the progress noted since the previous core inspection, improvement was still required.
Inspectors noted that a significant proportion of cases in our sample had indicators of domestic abuse (71 per cent), which was consistent with the wider Yorkshire and the Humber region caseload. Specific training in using information from the police and children’s services reflected the region’s focus on improving the quality of its practice. Practitioners were routinely requesting full domestic abuse histories, and these were readily available to them. Safeguarding enquiries were also widely completed, although there was less consistency in the process for obtaining this information, and in the quality of information received.
We were told that where probation staff, either safeguarding SPO leads or seconded practitioners, were embedded within local authorities, the quality and volume of information obtained improved significantly. While this dedicated resource had improved the consistency and availability of information-sharing, inspectors did not always see this information being used in assessments or analysed thoroughly. Examples included limited recognition of the presence and impact of weapon use, insufficient understanding of specific crime types linked to increased risk (such as cuckooing and serious organised crime), and safeguarding activity that was often too narrow in scope, for example because it focused on a single child or direct victim rather than considering all children or all identified and potential victims. Sufficient analysis of specific concerns and risks related to actual and potential victims was demonstrated in just under half of all relevant cases.
Building on feedback from the previous inspection relating to resettlement, the region had focused strategically on addressing longstanding barriers to effective public protection practice between prison and the community. This resulted in increased evidence of planning, stronger collaboration between POMs and community offender managers, and practitioners demonstrating critical thinking and working well with other agencies. Strategic plans had included resourcing bespoke mentoring for prison and probation POMs, developing the Prison Case Assessment Tool (PCAT) and introducing reflective peer supervision to improve self-legitimacy (as an authority figure, using professional judgement) and accountability. Both the assessment and planning stages demonstrated higher rates of sufficiency in resettlement cases than in community cases, indicating that these measures had begun to have a positive impact on the quality of work.
Inspectors found extensive evidence that the quality of supervision was directly linked to practitioners’ sense of professional confidence, accountability, and self‑legitimacy. Excessive workloads and an over‑reliance on a highly process‑driven framework also had an impact on the quality of work delivered. Probation practitioners were experiencing high workloads. This was particularly acute at PO grade; over half of POs were operating at more than 110 per cent on the workload management tool and a small number were operating at over 170 per cent. Additionally, excessive delays in vetting made it more difficult to fill staff vacancies.
The high vacancy rate at PO grade, alongside sickness and attrition, had created notable challenges in allocating cases, resulting in complex cases being assigned to inexperienced practitioners. In addition, high levels of staff turnover meant that practitioners were frequently subject to changes in line manager, many of whom also had varying levels of experience. This limited practitioners’ ability to consolidate learning and achieve consistency. While the Professional Qualification in Probation (PQiP) training supported a protected and structured learning environment, staff across all operational grades told inspectors that ongoing staffing pressures prevented them from pausing, reflecting, understanding, and embedding learning. This led to a sustained focus on procedural compliance with core tasks. These findings aligned closely with the deficits identified in the implementation and delivery of quality services, indicating that staff were focusing too much on completing transactional tasks rather than on gaining a comprehensive understanding of the purpose of the tasks; for example they had limited opportunity to analyse information, assess its implications for public protection and work with the person on probation to manage that risk.
Regional leaders acknowledged that PSO staff were not given the same protected and supported training offer as PQiP trainees; however, ongoing staffing shortages meant that cases of increasing complexity were being allocated to PSOs nonetheless. The gaps in knowledge and understanding that we identified during fieldwork aligned with the case inspection findings overall for keeping people safe; 13 out of 19 court reports prepared by PSO grade staff did not contain a sufficient assessment of the risk of serious harm. This continued into assessment practice, where there was an insufficient analysis of domestic abuse in 16 out of 24 relevant cases, and insufficient analysis of risk to children in 17 out of 22 relevant cases. In implementation and delivery, activity supporting the safety of others was effectively demonstrated in only three out of 27 relevant cases. Similarly, reviewing activity focused sufficiently on keeping people safe in only seven out of 25 relevant cases.
Practitioners told us they did not feel confident or sufficiently equipped to deliver interventions, particularly those relating to core public protection themes such as domestic abuse, safeguarding, sexual offending, and offence‑specific risk. Practitioners also reported that they did not have time to conduct home visits, and in some cases did not feel safe or confident to undertake them. Just under half of the relevant cases had a home visit where this was deemed necessary. Case recording was inconsistent. In some cases, the practitioner had used a structured framework, such as the CRISSA model, which supported clear decision‑making and effective links to the sentence plan. However, more frequently within the sample, we saw recording that reflected a ‘check‑in’ style appointment, with limited evidence of meaningful delivery, implementation, or reviewing.
Supervision sessions with people on probation were often needs‑focused, linked to a reluctance or lack of confidence to hold challenging, risk-based discussions. There were few examples of investigative or monitoring approaches such as wider police checks, contact with partners, or liaison with other agencies to verify and manage risk. This correlated with practitioners’ feedback during case interviews about limited confidence in their ‘in‑the‑room’ skills. Evidence of structured interventions specifically targeting risk was limited. The introduction of regional frameworks for completing contact entries, such as ‘WHAT’ (What, How, Actions, Timeframe) and ‘SBAR’ (Situation, Background, Assessment, Recommendation), where used, supported clarity of information and coherently linked the information available to risk management plans; however, these tools were not consistently implemented by all staff.
Sustained high workloads, ongoing change, and rapid staff turnover had created a culture of silo working. As a result, sentence management teams, already under sustained pressure, struggled to recognise how other functions within the organisation could support them to deliver effective risk management. Workload pressures and inexperience also made it difficult for senior probation officers (SPOs) to consistently identify practice deficits. In our case inspection, this meant opportunities to protect the public were missed; in 59 out of 83 relevant cases that should have received management oversight, we assessed that it was either ineffective or absent.
The region had implemented a range of measures to improve quality, including an SPO summit aimed at strengthening skills and understanding. The SBAR framework had been adopted, with the intention of relieving some of the pressure on SPOs, and RCAT auditing had been returned to the quality development officer (QDO) role in recognition of SPOs’ high workloads and wide spans of control. Leaders also reported that an experienced SPO within the QDO team was available to provide targeted support to middle managers. However, they acknowledged that this resource was under‑used, as SPOs were not proactively seeking this support due to workload and time‑management pressures.
Measures had been undertaken to improve quality. This included the use of SBAR for detailing decision-making, and the use of QDOs for RCAT auditing, as well as an offer to the SPO group targeting support for middle managers. Where casework was assessed as sufficient, effective management oversight was evident. Strategic leaders had recognised the need to provide further support and development for middle managers. Clinical staff from the Offender Personality Disorder (OPD) pathway were delivering SPO training in core relational practice skills. Ongoing evaluation and practice support from the OPD pathway were designed to align with SEEDS2 and professional curiosity principles were being used.
Many of the findings relating to the quality of practice in our case inspection aligned with those highlighted in the region’s serious further offence (SFO) reviews. The SFOs predominantly involved serious sexual offending, and the reviews identified an underestimation of risk and an absence of professional curiosity. This included insufficient alertness to risks and needs, failures to obtain initial and follow‑up information from partner agencies, and inadequate monitoring of and response to both existing and escalating risks. These themes consistently aligned with our findings relating to practitioners’ understanding, experience, and confidence in public protection practice. Analysis of recent SFO reports demonstrated strong analytical reviews and high‑quality action planning. The region’s SFO team demonstrated a clear focus on addressing systemic rather than individual omissions in an effort to shift the blame culture often associated with SFO learning.
Themes from SFOs were being fed into the region’s quality improvement plan. Leaders had developed work to strengthen practitioners’ professional curiosity and understanding of risk, demonstrating a clear regional commitment to learning from SFOs. Despite this, there remained a disconnect in implementation, as action plans were held within individual sentence management PDUs rather than being driven or coordinated by the SFO team. Given the workload pressures and wide spans of control at operational level, middle managers and PDU heads had limited capacity to prioritise and embed learning to improve the quality of practice. Positively, inspectors found strong links between SFO reviewing managers and the victim liaison team, including joint meetings and the delivery of a practice development day by the SFO team for victim liaison officers to share learning.
During our previous core inspection, the region reported that it had adopted the Human Factors approach to support a culture of learning, reflection and safety. However, senior leaders acknowledged that implementation had been inconsistent and that further strategic direction would be needed to drive meaningful cultural change. Building trust among staff was highlighted as a key priority, including creating a supportive environment and encouraging staff to recognise and address gaps in their practice. Encouragingly, our inspection found clear signs of progress towards a more collaborative and healthy professional culture across both senior and middle leadership teams. Staff and partners reported that senior leaders operated in a considered and measured way, which was promoting increased engagement and fostering individual and collective accountability across all grades.
At a strategic level, leaders were viewed as a visible and valued presence within key public protection forums. Policing partners acknowledged that there had previously been some challenges but recognised the current senior leadership team’s clear desire and commitment to strengthen these relationships. Police colleagues also highlighted strong operational working relationships, particularly within co‑located or jointly managed arrangements such as Management of Sexual Offenders and Violent Offenders (MOSOVO) and Integrated Offender Management (IOM) teams, which were reported to be functioning well. Similarly, strategic leaders from children’s services described positive and collaborative relationships, and referenced improvements in practice across both agencies where co‑location had been achieved. Since our previous inspection, leaders had continued to expand direct access to police and local authority systems. In contrast to our earlier findings, where access to timely information had been concerning, our case inspections identified that information was now widely available.
However, while information was now accessible, we found insufficient professional curiosity, and the complex landscape of local authority processes impacted on effective safeguarding practice. Practitioners reported notable barriers in obtaining intelligence from the police that was not related to domestic abuse but was pertinent to risk. Multi‑agency collaboration during implementation and delivery of the sentence was insufficient in too many cases, and reviewing activity was not consistently informed by the full range of information available from other professionals. Many practitioners appeared to lack confidence around professional challenge and escalation to overcome difficulties. As a result, we observed missed opportunities to safeguard proactively. Only 39 out of 89 relevant inspected cases demonstrated sufficiently well-coordinated involvement with other agencies to manage and minimise the risk of harm presented.
Following our core inspection in 2025, the region had undertaken significant work to address the substantial backlog in MAPPA Level 1 level‑setting and reviews, which had since been greatly reduced. Inspectors saw examples of good practice within MAPPA. This included monthly review meetings with the police, during which screening and level‑setting took place, which helped to prevent late referrals. In some areas, a renewed focus on Level 1 professional meetings had been introduced to counteract skewed lines of accountability, where practitioners were referring cases to Level 2 primarily for reassurance around risk management. This approach aimed to place responsibility back with practitioners to initiate and hold discussions with partners, rather than relying on MAPPA as the mechanism for doing so. While this was good to see, these improvements were not implemented consistently across the region and therefore did not provide regional assurance or support widespread upskilling.
Throughout fieldwork, regional colleagues, including Offender Personality Disorder teams and partners such as the police and children’s services, expressed concerns about the loss of experience and confidence among probation practitioners. Police colleagues reported receiving specific, week‑long, face‑to‑face training to carry out assessments with people who commit sexual offences. This training had previously been available to probation staff but was no longer provided. This directly correlated with feedback in our inspection interviews, where practitioners told us they did not feel equipped to hold explorative conversations with people on probation around sexual offending and other risky behaviours. Briefings had been provided by intervention colleagues to support the upskilling of new practitioners in ways of working with individuals to explore and address offending. However, they recognised that this training was needed on a regular basis, due to the significant turnover of staff, and that they were unable to resource it. As a result, many practitioners did not have sufficient access to training to enable them to deliver robust risk-related work.
National measures to manage capacity in the custodial estate continued to create significant operational pressure on delivery of sentence management. Practitioners told us that initiatives such as Probation Reset and Probation Impact were complicated and difficult to apply in practice, and that this limited their ability to create meaningful space in workloads. Operational challenges extended beyond volume alone. Core responsibilities, shaped by a combination of national and regional requirements, had become layered, fragmented and procedural. This complexity made effective decision-making harder for staff and contributed to them feeling overwhelmed.
Short‑term recalls disrupted the continuity of supervision, increased administrative demands and placed additional pressure on practitioners to manage rapid transitions between custody and the community. Police, IOM and MOSOVO colleagues and prison pre‑release teams described similar difficulties, with limited time available to adequately prepare for the release of high-risk and complex individuals. A shortage of beds in approved premises further complicated risk management, often necessitating out-of-area placements, weakening protective factors and adding further layers of complexity to risk management. These pressures had a direct impact on professionals’ ability to keep people safe. During fieldwork, we heard that difficulties in staffing approved premises were also impacting on sentence management. This was because staff, including middle managers, were drafted in to cover night shifts on top of their daily duties. Victim liaison teams also expressed concern that shorter sentences and rapid progression to release undermined victims’ confidence in the criminal justice system.
Interventions teams, particularly at a strategic level, were cohesive, clear on their remit and demonstrated a good understanding of how each intervention could and should contribute to effective risk management. The inclusion of electronic monitoring within the intervention portfolio was also recognised as a strength and the region had undertaken work to promote it as a tool for public protection. Significant work had been undertaken to improve the unpaid work offer across the region, with a strong focus on upskilling supervisors to support effective risk management. Recognition of the crucial role supervisors play in promoting safe behaviour, monitoring compliance, and escalating concerns had been strengthened through an enhanced training programme that went beyond the core offer. Team meetings and professional development days (PDDs) had centred on key public protection topics, including county lines, counter‑corruption, and modern slavery. Leaders had introduced a framework based on the ARCH system, which provided a concise summary of attendance, risk concerns, safeguarding, and health and safety within case records.
Leaders recognised that limited enforcement activity remained an ongoing issue for interventions teams. They had responded by introducing a hub model to take responsibility for standalone unpaid work requirements, with the intention of driving improvement. The implementation of auto‑enforcement had further strengthened this approach by ensuring that non‑compliant cases were automatically referred to the enforcement hub and required an active opt‑out. Enforcement hub staff were aware of the perception of siloed working. They described a key priority as supporting sentence management colleagues by ‘making the second largest region smaller’, seeking to embed a more coherent regional approach. A consistent theme from enforcement staff was their view that some practitioners lacked confidence in holding challenging conversations about non-compliance or the credibility of information being provided by the person on probation. Staff reported that practitioners often accepted the person on probation’s account without securing sufficient evidence. In response, the hub had shifted away from withdrawing cases and instead focused on making appropriate amendments. Enforcement processes were sometimes perceived as becoming transactional or ‘tick‑box’, rather than being used as an opportunity to explore the underlying causes of non‑compliance and support proportionate, defensible decisions.
At the time of inspection, evidence showed limited use of specific interventions to underpin public protection practice. Structured interventions, including accredited programmes, were underused or not fully understood by sentence management staff as ways of supporting the management of risk. Delivery of services to support the safety of other people was sufficient in only 33 per cent of inspected cases. Practitioners often lacked the confidence and/or knowledge to undertake offence-focused work, and we saw insufficient meaningful activity to address harmful behaviours.
Delivery of accredited programmes had been disrupted by the national implementation of Building Choices, as well as staffing shortages following facilitator job evaluations and delays in recruitment and vetting. At the point of inspection, only 44 out of 60 facilitator posts were filled. This meant that the region had been forced to implement priority access (in terms of programme capacity) for public protection cohorts. There were also delays in beginning programmes, with only 48% starting within the first nine months of their sentence. Additionally, interventions colleagues said that difficulties in obtaining materials had an impact on practitioners’ confidence. For example, the sentence management package that supports Building Choices had not been released at the same time that the Building Choices accredited programme was introduced. Positively, interventions colleagues had been proactive in supporting sentence management colleagues by holding briefings to address this shortfall; however, they acknowledged that this was without the package of material to support learning and understanding.
Services commissioned through the Regional Outcome Innovation Fund (ROIF) had enabled the region to deliver targeted interventions, including work with the National Autistic Society. Regional assurance activity had improved the use and quality of Commissioned Rehabilitative Services (CRS). We saw good examples of collaborative working, particularly with women’s services, although this focused primarily on needs rather than risk. Health and justice coordinators were linked into pre-release teams to support improvements in release planning, particularly for MAPPA-eligible cases requiring continuity of care in terms of health needs, including drugs and alcohol. Additionally, the health and justice coordinator was identified as the region’s death under supervision reviewer, supporting regional learning and practice improvements.
Accommodation for people on probation remained a critical challenge when considering public protection. High living costs and limited access to suitable housing within both the urban centres and large areas of rurality across the region created further difficulties. Furthermore, leaders had terminated contracts with housing providers, because of significant changes in the levels of risk and complexity of those being released, often at short notice, that CAS3 accommodation was not designed for. The decision to bring accommodation services ‘in-house’ reflected the region’s intention to strengthen relationships with local authority housing providers and mitigate associated risks.
Regional recommendations (Back to top)
- Develop practitioners’ confidence and skills in the use of professional curiosity and challenging conversations to identify, analyse, assess, plan, and respond to indicators of risk effectively.
- Ensure that senior probation officers have sufficient capacity and resources to undertake effective management oversight of casework.
- Improve the quality of court reports to inform sentencing proposals and work with sentencers to ensure that advice from probation court staff is obtained pre‑sentence.
- Improve the referral, recording and management of MAPPA cases by strengthening practitioners’ understanding of MAPPA and lines of accountability.
HMPPS recommendations (Back to top)
- Develop a national strategic approach to information-sharing with the police and children’s services to support regions in achieving consistency and compliance with legislation to obtain and use information to protect the public.
- Reduce vetting delays and address workforce instability by implementing streamlined and more regionally responsive recruitment processes.
- Provide regions with increased dedicated learning and development resource to enable greater delivery of training and continuous professional development activities for all staff.
Scoring (Back to top)
| Key question | Percentage ‘Yes’ |
| Does assessment focus sufficiently on keeping other people safe? | 43% |
| Does planning focus sufficiently on keeping other people safe? | 52% |
| Does the implementation and delivery of services effectively support the safety of other people? | 33% |
| Does reviewing focus sufficiently on keeping other people safe? | 40% |
Follow-up activity (Back to top)
In line with the recommendations identified, a range of follow-up activity will take place. HM Inspectorate of Probation will work with the region to identify what can be done to guide and support their work, increase knowledge and confidence, and provide a solid foundation for further improvement. The Inspectorate will also seek to share what effective practice looks like by drawing on inspection findings, identifying blockers to progress, and highlighting opportunities to improve accountability.
Key contextual facts (Back to top)
| Number of people supervised (on 30 September 2025)1 | 27,116 |
| MAPPA-eligible offenders (on 31 March 2025)2 | 10,708 |
| Victim satisfaction performance SL021 (April 2024 – March 2025)3 | 87.5% |
| Staffing level (staff in post full time equivalent (FTE))4 | ||
| Senior probation officer (PSO) | Probation officer (PO) | Probation services officer (inc. Professional Qualification in Probation (PQiP)) |
| 98% | 79% | 111% |
| Average caseload at the point of inspection (FTE) | ||
| PO | PSO (exc. PQiP) | PQiP |
| 35.90 | 50.74 | 31.99 |
| Recall rates (in the 12 months prior to inspection) | 22% |
| Average rehabilitation activity requirement (RAR) wait time (in the 12 months prior to inspection) | Not available |
| Percentage of RAR days completed (in the 12 months prior to inspection) | 60% |
| Percentage of accredited programme requirements completed for individuals convicted of a sexual offence (in the 12 months prior to inspection) | 12% |
| Percentage of accredited programme requirements completed for individuals not convicted of a sexual offence (in the 12 months prior to inspection) | 43% |
| Risk of Serious Harm classification of inspected cases | ||
| Low | Medium | High/very high |
| 4% | 61% | 33% |
Further information (Back to top)
This inspection was led by HM Inspector Joy Wilson supported by a team of inspectors and colleagues from across the Inspectorate. We would like to thank all those who helped plan and took part in the inspection; without their help and cooperation, the inspection would not have been possible.
Footnotes (Back to top)
- https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/offender-management-statistics-quarterly. ↩︎
- https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/multi-agency-public-protection-arrangements-mappa-annual-reports. ↩︎
- https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/community-performance-annual-update-to-march-2025. ↩︎
- Workforce data included in this report come from internal management information and some of these data have been derived from a different data source to the published HMPPS Workforce Statistics bulletin and accompanying Probation Officer Recruitment Annex. The Inspectorate needs access to the latest data available and internal management information is deemed the best source to allow this. As such, there could be discrepancies between the data in this report and the data contained in the publication. ↩︎