Dynamic Inspection of Public Protection in South Central region
Chief Inspector’s judgement (Back to top)
The regional approach to public protection was supported by strong strategic arrangements and commitment across the South Central region. This was reflected through governance structures, initiatives such as improved case oversight, and the introduction of human factors workshops, which focused on understanding how psychological and organisational influences affected decision-making and practice. Positive developments included robust face-to-face Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) for Level 1 reviews and the introduction of public protection indicators into probation delivery unit (PDU) performance reporting for leaders. However, these strengths were overshadowed by systemic challenges, rapid policy changes, and inconsistent assurance mechanisms. Delays in multi-agency information sharing continued to undermine the region’s ability to deliver high-quality public protection work. In the cases inspected, just over a third were sufficient in assessing risk of harm appropriately. Similarly, the delivery of work to address that risk was absent in almost two-thirds of cases.
Performance dashboards must include public protection-specific metrics, and staff training programmes need urgent reform to ensure practitioners are equipped for the realities of risk management. Without these changes, the system will continue to rely on process compliance rather than purposeful practice. His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) must lead the way in providing the resources, clarity, and infrastructure needed to embed public protection at the heart of probation delivery.
Despite investment in learning and development, workforce instability, high churn, and lengthy vetting times left many practitioners underprepared and under-skilled for complex risk management. Newly qualified officers and probation service officers (PSOs) reported significant gaps in practical training, particularly in handling domestic abuse and safeguarding, which compromised their ability to manage risk effectively. Workload pressures and poorly managed transfers of cases within the region and to other areas exacerbated these issues, creating gaps in continuity and impacting on managing the risk of harm posed effectively. Services intended to support public protection such as commissioned rehabilitative services (CRS), rehabilitation activity requirements (RAR), and accredited programmes were hampered by delays, capacity constraints, and inconsistent engagement, limiting their impact.
While recommendations have been identified for the region, national action is required to accelerate recruitment, reduce vetting delays, and strengthen assurance processes. National arrangements should support regions to enhance local autonomy and accountability, allowing local leaders greater flexibility to respond to the needs of their communities.
Context (Back to top)
We inspected public protection work across 56 cases that started between March and April 2025. The review looked at how well probation kept people safe, focusing on assessment, planning, implementation, and reviewing. We examined case files and spoke to practitioners, assessing both organisational arrangements and case-level practice. Most cases involved men aged 26–55, with common risks including domestic abuse, child safeguarding, sexual harm, hate crime, and violence. These risks were complex and required strong risk management. We saw some positive practice, including proactive multi-agency work and professional curiosity, but this was not consistent across the cases inspected.
The South Central region spans a large and complex area aligned with two police forces, Thames Valley, and Hampshire and Isle of Wight, and encompasses 13 local authority areas, including 11 unitary authorities and two county councils.
The region comprises six local justice areas with nine magistrates’ courts, seven Crown courts, and 25 community safety partnerships, alongside 13 youth offending teams and 12 safeguarding children’s boards. Service delivery is complex, with unique challenges, such as the Isle of Wight’s reliance on ferry crossings and Slough’s high deprivation and ethnic diversity. There are nine approved premises, including a women’s facility managed by the Elizabeth Fry Charity, and eight prisons.
The workforce stands at approximately 1,200 staff managing 12,115 cases, an increase in staff and a reduction in overall caseload since 2023. The seven PDUs operate across two police force areas: Thames Valley (Oxfordshire, Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes, West Berkshire, East Berkshire), and Hampshire and Isle of Wight (Hampshire North and East, Southampton, Eastleigh and New Forest, Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight).
HM Inspectorate of Probation last inspected the region, under our previous core inspection programme, in 2023. At that time, governance arrangements were generally effective, supported by performance and quality teams providing oversight of sentence management. However, significant staffing challenges persisted, particularly in Oxfordshire and Berkshire, where proximity to London and the absence of financial incentives hindered recruitment and retention. Although the region had invested in training, career progression, and wellbeing initiatives, senior probation officers (SPOs) and heads of local probation delivery units remained overstretched, limiting their capacity to deliver consistent and effective risk management.
Inspection commentary (Back to top)
Regional leadership in the South Central probation region demonstrated strong strategic intent, with public protection plans aligned to national priorities and supported by governance structures such as operational groups and Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) subgroups.
However, the region had been hampered in making progress in its public protection work. This was largely due to the reactive approach it had been required to employ because of prison capacity issues and challenges in the recruitment and retention of staff. Both elements had almost debilitated the region’s ability to progress and develop the work, despite its best efforts.
Scorecards and dashboards, which were often the focus for both leaders and practitioners, lacked public protection-specific indicators, which led to a focus on tasks that limited leaders’ ability to monitor the quality of public protection work sufficiently. Assurance mechanisms, including MAPPA action follow-up and quality assurance sampling, were inconsistent, creating gaps in accountability. For example, some MAPPA Level 1 reviews were not recorded in the case management system. In addition, escalation from Level 1 to Level 2 was delayed in some inspected cases because practitioners did not always understand the thresholds.
Operational relationships with police and social care partners were improving, supported by service-level agreements and stakeholder engagement. In positive examples of leadership, leaders had started to use different methods to support the development of their staff, for example milestone mapping and human factors workshops. These had helped staff to understand the ‘why’ behind decision-making. MAPPA Level 1 reviews were held face-to-face with structured agendas, creating space for critical conversations, and had led to improved decision-making. Despite these developments, systemic challenges remained. Rapid policy changes, largely linked to prison capacity pressures and resourcing gaps, had hindered consistent implementation across all PDUs, with significant variance across the north and south of the region. Practitioners reported that they had had to routinely prioritise imminent prison releases, rather than having the capacity to consider and reflect on others on their caseloads.
The information-sharing arrangements in place, underpinned by appropriate agreements, had strengthened the flow of risk-related intelligence. Although both police forces provided weekly arrest lists, practitioners reported persistent difficulties in contacting arresting officers, causing delays in recall decisions. There was also a risk of over-reliance on these lists, and underdeveloped professional curiosity, particularly among less-experienced staff who did not actively seek supplementary police intelligence to inform their risk management practice.
Across local authorities, information-sharing practices with children’s services were less consistent despite formal agreements. Effective risk management often depended on individual relationships and informal arrangements rather than robust, systemic processes, creating variability in practice and gaps in oversight. Of the inspected cases, we assessed almost two-thirds as not having sufficient management oversight that supported the management of the case appropriately.
Learning from serious further offences (SFOs) was not systematic. While approaches such as human factors analysis and milestone mapping had started to influence practice, the pace of change had created anxiety among staff, with some reporting that fear of SFOs drove process compliance rather than reflective decision-making. Our review of SFO quality assurance in the region echoed these concerns, identifying recurring weaknesses in risk assessment and management, including failure to consider all relevant information, underestimation of risk, and untimely reviews. Contingency planning and enforcement were inconsistent, information sharing was limited, and management oversight insufficient, compounded by optimism bias and lack of professional curiosity. Although resourcing had improved, learning from SFOs was not consistently embedded, and diversity needs were often overlooked. Greater clarity on priorities, stronger governance, and improved training were needed to embed learning, reduce recurrence, and strengthen public protection.
The region had invested in learning and development initiatives, including mentoring, practice development days, and reflective practice sessions. Human factors approaches had started to embed psychological safety and encourage problem-solving, while performance management processes had improved staff confidence in accountability. However, this accountability did not lead to practitioners understanding the purpose behind the tasks they were completing, or how those tasks were intended to be applied, other than to meet performance targets.
Staffing in the region remained a critical challenge, especially at the probation officer grade with a vacancy rate of over 30 per cent against target staffing numbers at the time of inspection. High churn, recruitment delays, and vetting times of up to 18 weeks undermined workforce stability. Newly qualified officers felt exposed post-qualification managing cases they did not feel confident or equipped in supervising. Gaps in training, particularly in domestic abuse, safeguarding, and structured interventions, persisted. Staff described PQiP (Professional Qualification in Probation) training as being theoretical and lacking practical application, leaving practitioners underprepared for complex risk management once qualified. In our case discussions, practitioners frequently displayed confidence in their abilities that was not matched by their actual knowledge and understanding of core public protection practice, resulting in gaps in their risk management practice. In over half of the relevant cases, there was insufficient engagement with other agencies to manage risks related to domestic abuse. In almost two-thirds of cases, practitioners did not work appropriately with children’s services where potential risks had been identified. In addition, home visits were not completed in more than half of the cases, even though such visits provide valuable insights for identifying and managing risk.
National training had focused on staff with less than two years’ experience and had not addressed gaps for others. Many of those who had trained while within former community rehabilitation companies (CRCs) would have had no longstanding experience of working with higher risk caseloads. The Covid-19 pandemic had led to further constraints for those undertaking training during this time. This disparity continued to affect practice quality.
In common with findings from our thematic inspection of recruitment, training, and retention of frontline probation practitioners.1 SPO capacity was stretched, and confidence in data use varied significantly, limiting effective oversight. In some PDUs, recently introduced insight reviews to replace other management oversight activity had resulted in a reflective approach, enabling early identification of risk issues and promoting learning. Leaders had worked to embed cultural change, encouraging staff to focus on the purpose behind actions rather than simply following processes. Workload pressures and the pace of organisational change contributed significantly to practitioner stress. Some staff reported feeling compromised when attempting to balance accurate case recording with the delivery of quality supervision, while fear of serious further offences had driven an overly process-focused approach at the expense of reflective practice. While current workload measures indicated that workloads across most grades were not unreasonable, this was not the experience of many staff who reported unmanageable workloads.
Transfers and handovers were frequently poorly managed, with cases delayed for extended periods and moved between practitioners without sufficient continuity; in some instances, transfers between PDUs within the region took up to four months, creating gaps in risk management. A structured approach to sharing learning was in place, using multiple methods to ensure transparency and continuous improvement. Bimonthly learning, effectiveness, and accountability panels (LEAPs) and monthly accountability meetings provided formal forums for discussion. These sessions systematically reviewed and disseminated findings from audits, inspections, SFO cases, complaints, deaths under supervision, and regional case assessment tool outcomes. Staff feedback indicated these mechanisms were well received, suggesting they were effective in promoting organisational learning and reinforcing accountability. The breadth of information shared with senior leaders demonstrated a commitment to evidence-based decision-making and a culture of openness. While evaluation was needed to assess how insights from these panels translated into measurable improvements in practice and risk management, we encourage the region to maintain this momentum given the positive reflection from staff.
Victim liaison teams were well resourced and demonstrated strong engagement with victims; however, recent prison release initiatives had heightened anxiety among victims, increasing both workload and liaison demands on these teams.
There were examples of effective practice, including complex case panels that provided practitioners with access to psychological expertise and created reflective spaces for addressing repeat arrests. In some PDUs, SPOs had led change initiatives and communicated updates through conversational models, which helped staff feel supported in how they managed risk. While cultural improvement initiatives were under way, the transition from process-driven to purpose-driven practice was not yet fully embedded. Clearer prioritisation, structured leadership development for SPOs, and sufficient time for staff to consolidate learning and embed good risk management practice remained essential.
Commissioning arrangements had delivered some positive outcomes, with the regional outcomes and innovation fund supporting innovative services and pre-release planning and focused oversight at this stage to support improved public protection in some areas. The ‘one referral’ hub model (see below) had streamlined referrals and reduced the administrative burden on practitioners, and stakeholder engagement had been strengthened through regular regional calls and the development of a knowledge hub. Court engagement had also improved, partly as a result of the region’s involvement in a pilot focused on pre-sentence advice that enabled more time and focus on good sentencing proposals, raising the profile of probation work and supporting better communication.
Routine stakeholder engagement led to practical solutions, such as producing videos for staff on managing mental health cases post-release and preparing community-based services for pending releases and associated demand. Despite these strengths, significant gaps remained in service delivery focused on risk reduction. CRS and RAR processes were underused or not fully understood, limiting their impact on public protection. Accommodation and drug and alcohol services faced persistent capacity challenges, and enforcement activity was slow and inconsistent, with breach report rejections creating barriers to timely action. Unpaid work arrangements had been restructured, but supervisor shortages and training gaps for placement coordinators continue to affect quality and compliance.
Structured interventions and the Building Choices accredited programme were prioritised for high-risk individuals, but backlogs and delays remained, particularly for men convicted of sexual offences. Neurodiversity adaptations were being introduced, yet not all staff were trained to deliver these effectively. The violent and sexual offenders register (ViSOR) was not routinely used by all appropriate staff, and polygraph testing was underutilised in informing risk management strategies and assurance of their impact was limited. There was a risk that vital information to inform appropriate and informed risk management was missed as a result.
In those PDUs designated as ‘red sites’ due to low staffing levels, the region had introduced a regional operations centre to relieve pressure on practitioners by completing key case management related tasks. While this has provided some workload relief, the delegation of initial supervision plans had created risks. In some cases we inspected, plans lacked sufficient risk analysis, and practitioners were unclear about required actions because they had not developed their own assessments and plans. This had the potential to undermine ownership and the quality of risk management.
A further initiative introduced by the region to manage workload was the one referral hub, which provided a single point of access for CRS referrals, improving processes and the quality of risk and needs information. Impressively, the hub had increased referrals by 162 per cent and received positive feedback from staff and providers. It had strengthened collaboration, reducing delays and duplication. The hub was due to have a phased roll out across the region, and this was potentially why our case inspections showed that it had not yet had a clear impact on improving risk management. Programme delivery, to protect the public appropriately, was hindered by staff who did not understand the required referral processes. There were waiting lists and limited alternatives when programmes were unavailable. CRS engagement was inconsistent, and referrals to providers such as Ingeus and CAS3 (for housing-related needs) were often missed or poorly followed up. These gaps reduced the effectiveness of rehabilitative services and limited their contribution to harm reduction.
Many of the prison releases in the region were from HMP Bullingdon. There had been a significant increase in the last two years to both recalls in the region and subsequent releases to the area. The resulting short sentences presented significant challenges to staff in how to manage risk appropriately on release and quick turnarounds. Short sentence function teams were in their early stages and as yet had limited impact on managing risk appropriately while adapting to the pace of these changes.
The scale and pace of change, combined with significant resourcing challenges over the past two years, had materially constrained the region’s ability to develop and progress as intended. Leadership must strengthen oversight, embed public protection-specific metrics, and rigorously evaluate new delivery models such as Reset, Impact, and the regional operations centre to ensure their effectiveness in safeguarding the public.
Staffing and service delivery were critical areas for improvement. While investment in learning and development, mentoring, and new delivery models and tools had driven some progress, workforce instability, training gaps, and high workloads compromised consistency and quality. Moving forward, the region must expand practical training, improve CRS compliance, and strengthen assurance processes for interventions and technology, ensuring that public protection is embedded across practice, policy, and strategy.
Regional recommendations (Back to top)
- Ensure timely and consistent information exchange with all relevant multi-agency partners, and address barriers to communication.
- Develop and implement targeted training and supervision approaches that promote professional curiosity and analytical thinking.
- Evaluate and strengthen the delivery of interventions and services aimed at reducing risk of harm.
HMPPS recommendations (Back to top)
- Reduce vetting delays and address workforce instability by implementing streamlined and more responsive recruitment processes.
- Embed public protection-specific metrics in dashboards to enable leaders to monitor quality and impact effectively.
- Review national arrangements to provide regions with greater autonomy in adapting risk management approaches to local contexts, while maintaining accountability and assurance.
- Develop and implement training for PQIP and continuing professional development programmes that gives priority to applying practical skills in managing complex risk, ensuring consistency and quality across all regions.
Scoring (Back to top)
Our analysis of inspected cases showed that the focus on keeping other people safe was inconsistent across key stages of practice. In only around one-third of cases, assessment sufficiently considered the safety of others, and planning achieved this in just under half. Implementation and delivery of services effectively supported safety in about one-third of cases, while reviewing focused on this area in just over two out of five cases. These findings indicate that risk management is not being embedded consistently throughout supervision. Weaknesses at the assessment stage can undermine planning and delivery, and limited attention during review reduces opportunities to respond to emerging risks. Greater emphasis is needed across all stages to ensure that protecting others is a central part of practice.
| Key question | Percentage ‘Yes’ |
| Does assessment focus sufficiently on keeping other people safe? | 34% |
| Does planning focus sufficiently on keeping other people safe? | 46% |
| Does the implementation and delivery of services effectively support the safety of other people? | 36% |
| Does reviewing focus sufficiently on keeping other people safe? | 42% |
Follow-up activity (Back to top)
In line with the recommendations identified, a range of follow-up activity will take place. HM Inspectorate of Probation will work with the region to identify what can be done to guide and support their work, increase knowledge and confidence, and provide a solid foundation for further improvement. The Inspectorate will also seek to share what effective practice looks like by drawing upon inspection findings, identify blockers to progress, and highlight opportunities to improve accountability.
Key contextual facts (Back to top)
| Number of people supervised (on 30 June 2025)2 | 13,585 |
| MAPPA-eligible offenders (on 31 March 2025)3 | 5,774 |
| Victim satisfaction performance SL021 (April 2024 – March 2025)4 | 88.5% |
| Staffing level (staff in post full time equivalent (FTE))5 | ||
| SPO | PO | PSO (inc. PQiP) |
| 100% | 69% | 115% |
| Average caseload at the point of inspection (FTE) | ||
| Senior probation officer (PSO) | Probation officer (PO) | Probation services officer (inc. Professional Qualification in Probation (PQiP)) |
| 34.31 | 42.06 | 31.57 |
| Recall rates (in the 12 months prior to inspection) | 19% |
| Average rehabilitation activity requirement (RAR) wait time (in the 12 months prior to inspection) | – |
| Percentage of RAR days completed (in the 12 months prior to inspection) | 51% |
| Percentage of accredited programme requirements completed for individuals convicted of a sexual offence (in the 12 months prior to inspection) | 33.57% |
| Percentage of accredited programme requirements completed for individuals not convicted of a sexual offence (in the 12 months prior to inspection) | 22.23% |
| Risk of serious harm classification of inspected cases | ||
| Low | Medium | High/very high |
| 11% | 68% | 20% |
Data annexe (Back to top)
Press release (Back to top)
Further information (Back to top)
This inspection was led by HM Inspector Wendy Martin supported by a team of inspectors and colleagues from across the Inspectorate. We would like to thank all those who helped plan and took part in the inspection; without their help and cooperation, the inspection would not have been possible.
Footnotes
- https://hmiprobation.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/document/a-thematic-inspection-of-the-recruitment-training-and-retention-of-frontline-probation-practitioners/ ↩︎
- https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/offender-management-statistics-quarterly ↩︎
- https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/multi-agency-public-protection-arrangements-mappa-annual-reports ↩︎
- https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/community-performance-annual-update-to-march-2025 ↩︎
- Workforce data included in this report come from internal management information and some of these data have been derived from a different data source to the published HMPPS Workforce Statistics bulletin and accompanying probation officer recruitment annex. The Inspectorate needs access to the latest data available and internal management information is deemed the best source to allow this. As such, there could be discrepancies between the data in this report and the data contained in the publication. ↩︎