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Dynamic Inspection of Public Protection in London

Published:

Chief Inspector’s judgement (Back to top)

This dynamic inspection of public protection work in the London probation region found that senior leaders had developed a clear understanding of the challenges affecting public protection and had begun to take purposeful action to address them.

Leaders demonstrated a strong commitment to improving the quality of practice, supported by well-developed systems for performance management and learning. These included structured quality assurance processes, increased use of reflective practice and a deliberate shift away from a narrow focus on process compliance towards the quality of decision-making and risk management.

Despite this positive direction, the quality of practice observed in the case sample remained inconsistent, and inspectors did not find sufficient evidence that improvements at a strategic level had translated into consistent outcomes in frontline delivery. Weaknesses were evident across all aspects of case management, including assessment, planning, implementation, delivery and reviewing. These weaknesses were systemic and reflected broader issues in workforce capability, confidence and capacity.

The cases inspected were characterised by high levels of complexity, including the frequent presence of domestic abuse, risks to children, mental health needs and multiple vulnerabilities. This context required strong professional curiosity, robust analytical capability and well-coordinated multi-agency work. Inspectors found that while these expectations were understood at a strategic level, they were not consistently realised in practice.

Information-sharing between the probation service and the Metropolitan Police remains a long-standing and significant concern that requires urgent prioritisation. Delays, incomplete information and inconsistent adherence to agreed protocols continued to impede effective risk assessment and management. London probation region had taken positive steps to improve the quality of requests for information and reduce the number of rejected requests. However, persistent delays in information-sharing and gaps in the information received had limited opportunities to maximise public protection, which should be a joint priority.

Leadership across the region was a clear strength. Leaders were visible, engaged and values-driven, and staff described a culture that supported learning and improvement. However, a significant gap remained between identified priorities and delivery in casework. The principal challenge for the region was ensuring that its strong strategic intent and developing infrastructure resulted in consistent effective public protection practice.


Context (Back to top)

London is the largest probation region in England and Wales, covering the whole of Greater London. It is responsible for supervising a substantial and diverse caseload, including individuals subject to community orders and suspended sentence orders, and those released from custody on licence. The scale of demand reflects London’s population size, levels of mobility and the wide range of risks and needs presented by people on probation.

We inspected public protection work across 102 cases that started in November 2025. The review looked at how well probation kept people safe, focusing on assessment, planning, implementation, and reviewing.

The region is organised into four operational districts, providing a structure that supports both strategic oversight and locally responsive service delivery. Each district is aligned with geographical areas of London, which enables it to take a tailored approach to addressing local patterns of offending, demographic differences and demand pressures. This structure, with district heads of operations, allows the region to balance consistency in standards with flexibility in delivery.

Within these four districts, the London probation region is further organised into 18 probation delivery units (PDUs). PDUs are the primary level at which frontline services are delivered and managed. They oversee case management and resettlement activity, ensuring that operational delivery is coordinated effectively and aligned with local needs and priorities. In addition, the region has 12 approved premises, which provide enhanced supervision and accommodation for people on probation who present a higher risk of serious harm. These settings play a critical role in risk management, offering structured environments with 24-hour staffing, curfews and targeted support to help individuals stabilise and transition safely back into the community.

Across the region, London probation works closely with 33 local authorities, encompassing every London borough and the City of London, which add to the complexity of the region. These partnerships are critical in addressing the complex and often interrelated needs of people on probation, including housing, safeguarding, substance misuse and mental health. There was significant variation in the strength of the relationships between local authorities and PDUs. The most effective areas demonstrated strong strategic leadership and productive operational collaboration, whereas other areas had less mature partnerships that limited the effectiveness of joint working and information-sharing arrangements.

London probation operates within a complex environment. It manages high volumes of cases, including a significant proportion of individuals assessed as presenting a high or very high risk of harm. Workforce pressures, including recruitment, retention and experience levels, were evident. These pressures were compounded by the scale of demand and the complexity of partnership arrangements across the capital.

As seen across other regions, prison release initiatives and changes resulting from the Sentencing Act had a substantial impact on service delivery. Increased case volumes and additional operational demands placed considerable pressure on staff, affecting their capacity to deliver routine business-as-usual activities while implementing these changes.

At the time this inspection was announced, the London region had 2,449 staff in post. Staff were responsible for managing 37,195 people on probation – 15 per cent of the national caseload. This included approximately 24,409 individuals supervised in the community, made up of those subject to community sentences and those supervised on licence. A further 13,035 were serving custodial sentences. Although staffing numbers were improving, significant gaps remained, most notably a 33 per cent vacancy rate at probation officer grade.


Inspection commentary (Back to top)

The inspection found a region with ambitious leadership, substantial investment in improvement activity and a clear commitment to strengthening public protection. Senior leaders demonstrated a detailed understanding of the factors affecting performance, including workforce instability, increasing case complexity, organisational change and long-standing system pressures. Leaders also described a more mature organisational culture, characterised by greater openness, stronger leadership engagement and an increasing focus on quality rather than compliance.

The region had made a significant investment in governance, workforce development, partnership working and specialist public protection arrangements. Leaders had introduced innovative operating models, specialist multi-agency forums and enhanced quality assurance processes, demonstrating that they were actively seeking solutions to persistent challenges. However, despite these positive developments, inspection evidence identified a substantial gap between strategic ambition and frontline delivery. Weaknesses in assessment, planning, implementation and review remained evident across casework, audits and Serious Further Offence reviews. The key priority for the region is ensuring that investment in leadership, partnerships and learning translates into consistently effective public protection practice.

Leadership was a significant strength. Regional leaders demonstrated a strong understanding of public protection and openly acknowledged weaknesses in professional judgement, risk assessment, management oversight and safeguarding practice. Leaders provided a coherent account of how workforce pressures, recruitment difficulties, organisational change and capability gaps had affected practice.

Governance arrangements were comprehensive. Performance data, audit findings, inspection evidence and partnership intelligence were routinely scrutinised, and public protection featured prominently within strategic discussions. A range of assurance mechanisms had been established, including specialist governance of public protection, multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA) scrutiny, quality review activity and Serious Further Offence learning processes. PDU leaders described positive relationships with senior leaders and greater visibility and support than had existed previously. While governance arrangements provided a strong understanding of performance issues, there was less evidence of sustained improvement in frontline public protection practice.

As we have seen elsewhere, workforce capability was one of the most significant factors affecting public protection. Leaders consistently described an inexperienced workforce managing increasingly complex caseloads. Workforce churn, high vacancy rates and the loss of experienced practitioners had reduced organisational expertise and confidence.

Inspection evidence identified weaknesses in professional judgement, analytical thinking and decision-making. Practitioners were generally committed and motivated but did not always demonstrate confidence when analysing risk, challenging information or responding to safeguarding concerns. These issues were compounded by operational pressures on managers, which limited opportunities for reflective supervision, direct observation and developmental coaching.

Recruitment and retention remained challenging, particularly at probation officer grade. Persistent vacancies increased workload pressures and affected team stability, while lengthy vetting and pre-employment processes contributed to delays in filling posts. In some cases, candidates withdrew before taking up appointments, prolonging staffing shortages.

The region had invested significantly in workforce development through mentoring, reflective practice, quality practice hubs, management development and Serious Further Offence learning. While leaders demonstrated a strong commitment to professional development, the impact on frontline practice was less evident. Similar themes relating to safeguarding, assessment and professional curiosity continued to recur through quality assurance and Serious Further Offence reviews, suggesting difficulties embedding learning into day-to-day practice.

The Probation Prioritisation Framework was used extensively across London, and all PDUs were operating within either the amber or red tiers at the time of the inspection. This was an improvement from our last inspection of London in 2022, when 12 PDUs had operated at the red level. Leaders described the framework as an important mechanism for managing organisational risk and providing transparency about resource pressures. However, prolonged operation of the framework had created unintended consequences. Many staff had limited experience of working outside the prioritised arrangements and some appeared to believe that the framework prevented them from carrying out activities that should have been undertaken on public protection grounds. Inspectors found that staff did not always exercise professional judgement – they did not consistently escalate concerns and sometimes missed opportunities to undertake additional risk-related activities. In some cases, the framework appeared to have become a substitute for professional judgement rather than a mechanism to support it.

These issues were compounded by weaknesses in management oversight. Where practitioners were not routinely discussing risk-related decisions with managers, opportunities to review prioritisation decisions, exercise professional judgement and address emerging concerns were sometimes missed. Inspectors found examples where identified risks had not been fully explored or acted upon, increasing the likelihood that important public protection issues were not sufficiently addressed.

Inspectors found evidence that the organisational culture was healthier than it may have been previously. Leaders and staff frequently referred to learning, reflection and support rather than blame. There was evidence of increasing openness about weaknesses, particularly through quality improvement activity and Serious Further Offence reviews. Nevertheless, cultural development remained incomplete, particularly in relation to professional confidence and accountability.

The region had achieved notable improvements against national performance measures. Leaders had appropriately recognised and celebrated this progress, which had contributed to improved staff morale and a stronger sense of organisational confidence. Many staff described these achievements as motivating and reported greater optimism about the region’s direction of travel. Stronger performance management arrangements had improved compliance and operational delivery. However, the region was not yet demonstrating consistent quality improvements in assessment, planning, implementation and review. The challenge for leaders is to build on improvements in performance by placing equal emphasis on professional judgement, risk management and public protection outcomes.

Inspectors observed a genuine commitment to developing professional capability. Leaders recognised that compliance-based approaches alone would not improve public protection outcomes and had sought to encourage deeper professional reflection. They had introduced quality practice hubs, critical case reviews and peer-learning sessions, which demonstrated a clear attempt to strengthen analytical skills and professional curiosity.

However, a recurring theme throughout the inspection was the difficulty of embedding learning into practice. Operational pressures, workload demands, workforce turnover and cognitive overload were all identified as barriers to implementation. Similar themes emerged through Serious Further Offence learning, where long-standing concerns relating to safeguarding, risk assessment and professional curiosity continued to recur despite extensive learning activity.

While we identified gaps in casework across all grades, it was particularly concerning to find poor risk management practice among those training to become probation officers. These practitioners represent an important part of the region’s future workforce and will be central to addressing ongoing staffing pressures. However, they were not consistently receiving the level of support, supervision and development required to build their confidence and competence in managing risk. The quality of practice observed suggests that greater investment in training, mentoring and oversight is needed to ensure that trainee probation officers are equipped to undertake this critical aspect of their role effectively and safely.

The quality of assessment represented a significant area of concern. Practitioners frequently gathered information but did not always analyse it effectively. Risk assessments often lacked sufficient depth, failed to identify the significance of available information or did not adequately consider the interaction between offending behaviour, safeguarding concerns and wider vulnerability factors.

Professional curiosity emerged as a recurring weakness. Practitioners did not consistently explore concerns relating to domestic abuse, safeguarding, exploitation, victim vulnerability or changing life circumstances. In almost two-thirds of cases practitioners failed to analyse the risk of harm presented to actual or potential victims. Information was often recorded without sufficient analysis of its implications for risk management.

Leaders recognised these weaknesses and identified similar patterns through Serious Further Offence reviews, audit activity and quality assurance processes. The consistency of these findings suggests that weaknesses in assessment are systemic rather than isolated. These deficiencies had clear consequences for subsequent planning, implementation and review activity.

Planning activity was often compromised by weaknesses in assessment. Plans did not consistently focus on managing identified risks, safeguarding potential victims, or responding effectively to emerging concerns. Contingency planning was a particular area of weakness. In some cases, plans lacked clear escalation routes, failed to anticipate changes in circumstances, or relied on generic responses to significant risks. In half of the cases inspected, contingency arrangements were either absent or insufficiently robust to manage risk effectively.

The implementation and delivery of risk management activity was variable and the weakest of all inspected case areas. Just over half of all relevant cases appropriately involved other agencies in risk management activity. Opportunities to intervene, challenge behaviour, enforce compliance or coordinate partner activity were not always maximised. Some supervision activity appeared to focus on completing processes rather than active public protection.

Reviewing activity demonstrated similar limitations. Reassessment of risk was not always dynamic, and practitioners did not consistently adapt plans in response to new information. Reviews were not always used effectively to challenge professional thinking, check progress, or identify and respond to new risks and concerns. Almost two-thirds of relevant inspected cases failed to appropriately identify and analyse new information and adjust risk management where it was needed. Collectively, these weaknesses reduced the effectiveness of public protection arrangements and limited the region’s ability to demonstrate that identified risks were being managed proactively.

Inspectors identified innovative infrastructure designed to support public protection. The Operational Assistance Hub and London Service Centre demonstrated creative approaches to workforce pressures and operational resilience. These functions improved consistency, timeliness and oversight of key processes and provided valuable support to frontline teams. To mitigate workload pressures, some functions, including the completion of some assessments and police and children’s social care checks, had been delegated to these teams. While this reflected a pragmatic and innovative response to workforce pressures, it had in some cases reduced practitioners’ depth of understanding and ownership of individual cases. Information obtained from partner agencies was not consistently reviewed or used to strengthen risk management activity. As a result, important information relating to children, victims and safeguarding concerns was not always fully understood by, or readily accessible to, the supervising officer.

The region demonstrated a strong strategic commitment to victim safety and safeguarding. Senior leaders were clear that public protection should be victim-focused and described significant efforts to strengthen victim services, improve victim liaison arrangements and increase the visibility of victim issues within governance processes.

There was evidence of positive partnership working with safeguarding services, victim organisations and wider criminal justice partners. Statutory contact with victims through the Victim Contact Scheme had been strengthened through additional resources and improved processes, including arrangements to ensure relevant information was routinely received from the Police Witness Care Unit. However, this strategic commitment to victims was not reflected in frontline casework. Victim considerations were not consistently embedded within assessments, plans and reviews. Safeguarding issues were sometimes identified, but this did not result in clear actions to manage risk. Professional curiosity about risks to children, vulnerable adults and current or potential victims remained inconsistent. The evidence suggested that victim safety was widely understood as a strategic priority but had not yet become a consistently embedded feature of everyday practice.

Partnership working within structured arrangements was largely positive. Inspectors identified examples of effective collaboration with the police, local authorities, prisons, safeguarding agencies, health services and commissioned providers. They observed particularly strong practice within specialist forums. Integrated Offender Management, specialist stalking arrangements, violence reduction initiatives, county lines work and the Community Harm and Exploitation Panel demonstrated effective information-sharing and joint risk management. These arrangements were characterised by professional curiosity, shared ownership of risk and dynamic responses to emerging concerns.

MAPPA arrangements also demonstrated strengths, particularly within higher-level meetings where attendance, information-sharing and risk management discussions were generally effective. However, concerns about Level 1 management were raised repeatedly. Assurance arrangements appeared less developed for this cohort, despite the volume of individuals managed through Level 1 processes.

Partnership working was less effective outside formal structures. Information-sharing frequently depended on local relationships, co-location arrangements and individual persistence. Variation across boroughs and partner agencies contributed to an inconsistent experience of partnership support and information sharing.

Information-sharing between the probation service and the Metropolitan Police remains a long-standing concern. Although information-sharing protocols were established and understood by both organisations, they were not consistently followed. Delays in requesting and sharing information, and gaps in the information provided, sometimes reduced its value in informing assessments and risk management activity. Work had been undertaken to improve the quality of information requests submitted by probation practitioners, resulting in a reduction in rejected requests. This demonstrated a positive commitment by London probation to strengthening information-sharing arrangements. However, inspectors remained concerned that delays, incomplete information and inconsistent compliance with agreed protocols continued to undermine practitioners’ ability to maintain an up-to-date understanding of risk. As a result, opportunities to strengthen public protection were not always maximised.

The region had invested considerably in specialist services, commissioned provision and operational support functions. It had introduced intervention services, accommodation provision, victim services and commissioned rehabilitative support, which reflected a significant effort and generally positive relationships with providers. Nevertheless, the availability of services did not always translate into effective risk management. The quality of referrals remained variable, and providers frequently described receiving insufficient information to support delivery. Practitioners did not always integrate interventions, commissioned services and specialist support into coherent plans to reduce risk and protect the public. Consequently, the challenge for the region is less about service availability and more about ensuring available resources are used effectively within day-to-day case management.

London probation had established many of the foundations necessary for improvement. Leadership was reflective and ambitious, governance was well developed, partnerships were generally strong and significant investment had been made in workforce development, service provision and public protection infrastructure.

Inspectors identified examples of effective practice, particularly within specialist multi-agency arrangements and operational support functions. However, workforce inexperience, weaknesses in analytical practice, variable management oversight and difficulties embedding learning continued to affect the quality of assessment, planning, implementation and review.

The main challenge was not identifying the reasons for poor performance, as leaders have a clear understanding of the issues. The challenge was making sure improvement work leads to consistent changes in practice and better public protection outcomes; until then, the gap between what leaders expect and what happens in day-to-day practice is likely to remain.

The next stage of improvement will depend on translating strategic ambition into consistently effective frontline delivery, ensuring that learning is embedded within practice and strengthening practitioners’ confidence in managing risk and harm.


Regional recommendations (Back to top)

  1. Develop practitioners’ confidence and skills in the use of professional curiosity and challenging conversations to identify, analyse, assess, plan and respond to indicators of risk effectively.
  2. Ensure senior probation officers have sufficient capacity and resources to undertake effective management oversight of casework.
  3. Improve the quality and prioritisation of information requests submitted to the Metropolitan Police Service and strengthen local quality assurance arrangements to ensure that practitioners seek, escalate and effectively use police information to inform risk assessments, sentence management and public protection activity.
  4. Improve the referral, recording and management of MAPPA cases by strengthening practitioners’ understanding of MAPPA and lines of accountability.

HMPPS recommendations (Back to top)

  1. Develop a national strategic approach to information-sharing with the police and children’s services to support regions in achieving consistency and compliance with legislation to obtain and use information to protect the public.
  2. Reduce vetting delays and address workforce instability by implementing streamlined and more regionally responsive recruitment processes.
  3. Develop and implement training for Professional Qualification in Probation (PQIP) and continuing professional development programmes that gives priority to applying practical skills in managing complex risk, to ensure consistency and quality across all regions.

Scoring (Back to top)

Key questionPercentage ‘Yes’
Does assessment focus sufficiently on keeping other people safe?34%
Does planning focus sufficiently on keeping other people safe?48%
Does the implementation and delivery of services effectively support the safety of other people?25%
Does reviewing focus sufficiently on keeping other people safe?29%

Follow-up activity (Back to top)

In line with the recommendations identified, a range of follow-up activity will take place. HM Inspectorate of Probation will work with the region to identify what can be done to guide and support their work, increase knowledge and confidence, and provide a solid foundation for further improvement. The Inspectorate will also seek to share what effective practice looks like by drawing upon inspection findings, identify blockers to progress, and highlight opportunities to improve accountability.


Key contextual facts (Back to top)

Number of people supervised (on 31 December 2025)137,195
MAPPA-eligible offenders (on 31 March 2025)211,220
Victim satisfaction performance SL021 (April 2024 – March 2025)378.4%
Staffing level (staff in post full time equivalent (FTE))4
Senior probation officer (PSO)Probation officer (PO)Probation services officer (inc. Professional Qualification in Probation (PQiP))
80%67%100%
Average caseload at the point of inspection (FTE)
POPSO (exc. PQiP)PQiP
35.6149.8424.11
Recall rates (in the 12 months prior to inspection)18.82%
Average rehabilitation activity requirement (RAR) wait time (in the 12 months prior to inspection)Not available
Percentage of RAR days completed (in the 12 months prior to inspection)58%
Percentage of accredited programme requirements completed for individuals convicted of a sexual offence (in the 12 months prior to inspection)33.43%
Percentage of accredited programme requirements completed for individuals not convicted of a sexual offence (in the 12 months prior to inspection)26.48%
Risk of Serious Harm classification of inspected cases
LowMediumHigh/very high
9%64%25%

Further information (Back to top)

This inspection was led by HM Inspector Wendy Martin, supported by a team of inspectors and colleagues from across the Inspectorate. We would like to thank all those who helped plan and took part in the inspection; without their help and cooperation, the inspection would not have been possible.

  1. https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/offender-management-statistics-quarterly. ↩︎
  2. https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/multi-agency-public-protection-arrangements-mappa-annual-reports. ↩︎
  3. https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/community-performance-annual-update-to-march-2025. ↩︎
  4. Workforce data included in this report come from internal management information and some of these data have been derived from a different data source to the published HMPPS Workforce Statistics bulletin and accompanying Probation Officer Recruitment Annex. The Inspectorate needs access to the latest data available and internal management information is deemed the best source to allow this. As such, there could be discrepancies between the data in this report and the data contained in the publication. ↩︎