Dynamic Inspection of Public Protection in Kent, Surrey and Sussex

Chief Inspector’s judgement (Back to top)

This review of the Probation Service’s public protection across Kent, Surrey and Sussex revealed that, whilst there had been improvements since our last inspection, concerningly, work to keep people safe met the required standard in less than half the cases inspected for ‘assessment’ and ‘implementation and delivery’. In addition, just over half the cases met this standard for case ‘planning’ and ‘reviewing’.

The region’s public protection work had been made more challenging by large-scale national changes in response to prison overpopulation. We found that more support was needed for staff managing complex cases, particularly those involving domestic abuse, and work needed to be done to ensure consistency across all cases.

A primary concern was a lack of quality information sharing of the risks posed by individuals on probation, with probation service and police colleagues highlighting the challenges faced by both organisations to balance public protection with proportionate, compliant information sharing. We were encouraged to see work underway and resource allocated to strengthen relationships. However, there remained no centrally driven directive on what should be shared. This was a long-standing issue which continued to undermine the region’s ability to understand fully the risk posed by those they supervised. A national strategic approach to ensure consistency and compliance from both probation and partners was required to facilitate effective public protection work.

The region was affected by ongoing workforce challenges, with understaffing at both probation officer and senior probation officer grades at the time of the inspection. This inevitably affected capacity to manage demanding caseloads and risk to the public. Constraints including proximity to London, associated high costs of living, lengthy vetting procedures and limited autonomy in recruitment continued to compound these workforce pressures.

In response, the region had introduced a range of innovative strategies to optimise resources, including the use of technology and artificial intelligence, and was working to address training gaps to improve the quality of case management, despite limited resources.

While sufficient work to keep people safe was not evident in enough of the cases we inspected, following the region’s inspection in 2024, we also saw strategic progress in strengthening public protection work, improved staff accountability and engagement, and a commitment to building a culture that supported learning and psychological safety.

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Context (Back to top)

This inspection focused specifically on public protection work across the Kent, Surrey and Sussex Probation region. A sample of 56 cases were inspected, and we concentrated on the region’s delivery of activity to keep people safe. Case inspections examined assessment, planning, implementation and delivery, and review, through the lens of public protection. We inspected the effectiveness of multi-agency work and risk management work, both restrictive and rehabilitative.

The Probation region covered a large geographical area with a complex governance landscape, spanning three police forces, two unitary authorities, three county councils and 24 district borough councils. Probation services were delivered across six probation delivery units (PDUs). The region had 17 courts, three approved premises (APs), and 12 prisons within its footprint. At the time of inspection, the region was implementing at pace several national policies aimed at managing workloads across the prison and probation estates, including prison early release schemes, Probation Reset, Impact, and changes to recall policy. The Independent Sentencing Review (published May 2025) recommended greater use of alternatives to custody to address over-population, which was likely to have a further impact on the demands placed on the Probation Service.

Kent, Surrey and Sussex were previously inspected in 2023/2024. The regional inspection report was published in May 2024 and found strong strategic arrangements that were not always translating into effective work with people on probation, and a fragile staffing picture. Although work with victims was outstanding, work across all areas of service delivery, including public protection, were rated inadequate, and the region as requiring improvement.

At the time the inspection was announced, the region was operating with just under two-thirds of the target staffing for qualified probation officers, reflecting long-standing staffing challenges for the region linked to proximity to London, high costs of living and high numbers of Professional Qualification in Probation (PQIP) withdrawals and resignations.

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Inspection commentary (Back to top)

Case inspections highlighted that, for both assessment and implementation and delivery, less than half the cases met the required standard to keep people safe. Planning and reviewing met the required standard in just over half the cases. There were indicators that the sufficiency of work to keep people safe was on an upward trajectory in Kent, Surrey and Sussex across all the above areas. Practitioners were completing meaningful home visits and speaking to the families and support networks of people on probation where appropriate to improve risk management. MAPPA cases (multi-agency public protection arrangements) were also managed effectively. Planning for restrictions and monitoring was generally stronger than planning for interventions and programmes to address risk. Restrictions were consistently included in plans and compliance arrangements were clear, although there was less detail on interventions that would take place to address attitudes and behaviour.

While casework data showed a higher level of sufficiency than in previous inspections, organisational delivery also demonstrated notable improvement in supporting work to keep people safe than had been evident during previous inspections of the region. Although there remained some considerable way to go, in part the improvements had been achieved through a targeted quality approach. This included improved quality assurance, supervision and reflective practice and the allocation of resources to complete peripheral work, maximising front line staff capacity and reducing cognitive overwhelm.

Putting the public protection strategy into operation from the top down to the frontline ensured staff knew to prioritise quality work to protect the public. Learning how operational staff best digested and acted on information had been driven regionally, with staff engagement and investment in improving playing a pivotal role. Messaging about priorities was consistent, and recent appointments of both a new acting Area Executive Director and Regional Probation Director had supported the ongoing focus to drive improvements in keeping people safe.

Public protection was a standing agenda item within the regional leadership team (RLT) and was supported by dedicated forums such as the public protection meeting, MAPPA strategic meeting, and Quality and Performance Boards. These meetings provided clear governance and enabled strategic decisions to be translated into operational practice. Initiatives like See the Way Forward¹(STWF) and quality development processes were monitored through regular review, dip sampling, and feedback loops. This layered governance model, combining strategic leadership with operational and thematic meetings, created a consistent focus on safeguarding the public, aligning resources, and addressing emerging risks.

Large-scale national change and responses to prison over-population, as well as delays in sentencing, had a destabilising effect on people on probation, making public protection work in Kent, Surrey and Sussex more challenging. Those sentenced and released on the day from court, due to time served on remand, meant pre-release planning could not be delivered in a meaningful way. The increase in people on probation due to early release from custody schemes also affected the time available to set services up to meet their needs and manage their risks. Short recall periods were at risk of disrupting continuity and partner agency involvement, often leaving probation practitioners as the only consistent presence throughout the sentence.

Although Probation Reset arrangements were outside the region’s control, they had a detrimental impact on public protection work. Planned service delivery including challenging conversations or interventions were often disrupted by reset, a concern that was most pronounced in complex domestic abuse cases. Regional leaders were implementing a model to transfer all reset cases to a dedicated hub, though this process was still being refined and audited. ‘Quick guides’ outlined eligibility criteria and checklists for pre-reset tasks, with guidance focused mainly on recording and concluding processes. However, casework inspections highlighted varied and inconsistent practices in which victim and risk information was prioritised at transfer, creating a sense of instability and lack of coherence. Reset hubs were in the early stages of implementation, with communication and monitoring mechanisms already in place, though their intended effect on consistency had not yet been fully realised.

Challenges faced in managing risk to the public were compounded by long-standing staffing challenges, influenced by proximity to London and the associated high cost of living. Since the previous inspection, the percentage of qualified probation officers in post had declined, with current staffing at approximately two-thirds of the target level. There was also understaffing of senior probation officers by over 10 per cent. This inevitably affected capacity to manage demanding caseloads. The region was actively implementing measures within its control to optimise resources, such as a focus on the retention of PQiPs, where significant numbers were resigning or withdrawing. However, additional constraints, such as vetting processes and limited autonomy in recruitment, continued to complicate efforts to address these workforce pressures.

In response to continuing staffing pressures, the region had introduced a range of innovative and accountable strategies to optimise resources. These included the use of technology, artificial intelligence, and the See the Way Forward approach, which streamlined complex or duplicate processes. Sometimes tasks were reallocated, to free practitioners’ time for meaningful work, including activities that promoted public protection. The region sought to identify gaps in training by conducting training needs analyses and exploring new ways to improve this activity. The region introduced a range of activities to strengthen staff capability and support informal learning. Examples included deploying quality development officers (QDOs) to provide specialist guidance and development in key areas and implementing pod structures to promote informal learning and peer-to-peer knowledge sharing. Technology had been particularly effective, offering practitioners practical support and reassurance that solutions were being developed to alleviate workload pressures. The region was proactive in engaging in trials from central HMPPS, designed to improve the recording and accessibility of information for practitioners.

Case inspections found limited evidence of management oversight recorded formally on the case management system. However, opportunities for oversight were increasingly being woven into the organisational culture. A strategic approach was evident, prioritising the quality and meaningfulness of oversight rather than its frequency. Staff across all grades were observed, and 360-degree feedback processes were in place. Managers were expected to facilitate reflective supervision both individually and within teams, supported by the streamlining or removal of other responsibilities to create capacity for this.

A developed culture of feedback and reflection was evident, dovetailing learning, psychological safety for staff and accountability. Increased auditing and reflective discussions had strengthened the region’s understanding of quality. As a result, accountability processes had been reinforced, with several performance improvement plans introduced where necessary. Opportunities to observe practice across all grades had provided valuable insight into both quality and productivity, while also highlighting areas for improvement.

Integration of learning from Serious Further Offences (SFOs) into wider practice strands was impressive. This approach promoted collective responsibility rather than a blame culture. Learning points were monitored, reinforcing continuous improvement. Work to prepare and support newly qualified officers (NQOs) had also been prioritised, with initiatives aimed at equipping them for practice, an investment likely to contribute to improved retention over time.

While the workload measurement tool (WMT) was designed to support equitable allocation of work, observations suggested that it was sometimes viewed by practitioners, unhelpfully, as a point of reference to highlight capacity pressures, despite the tool being outdated and not fully reflecting demand. This approach, while understandable, could inadvertently shift the focus away from shared accountability and collaborative problem-solving. Despite this, Heads of PDUs showed clarity and authority in holding staff to account, balancing this responsibility with the realities of overstretched teams.

As we see too often, the quality of information sharing, and receipt of information from other agencies, pertaining directly to the risks posed by the individuals on probation, was lacking in some cases. We were told very candidly that the sharing of information from police and children’s services, in order to support public protection work by probation “is a national strategic issue – and the national strategy is sort it out locally”.

The region was, however, actively working to address barriers to accessing information from partners, including police and children’s services, and improvements had been made since the last inspection. Regional strategic-level discussions were taking place with police, although variation remained between forces (and therefore PDU) in both the quality of information and levels of engagement. In this inspection, the quality of information received was a primary concern, and our meeting with police colleagues highlighted the challenges faced by both organisations to balance public protection with proportionate, compliant information sharing. There was work underway to strengthen relationships and the region had dedicated resource to try and improve information sharing. Partners expressed an appetite for these discussions, although there remained no centrally driven directive on what should be shared.

Work to improve information sharing with children’s services appeared more mature at a regional level. Notably, self-service checks completed by probation staff were established in some probation delivery units, and there was clear alignment and consistency in terms of how this system operated. Once information was provided, there was minimal need for follow-up in order to fill in gaps in the information received, reflecting streamlined and meaningful information exchange. Much of this progress stemmed from work initiated over the last two years, supported by increased co-location and collaborative practices.

The region recognised from their own assurance activity that the quality of work from probation services officers (PSOs) was not always as strong as qualified officers; inequitable training provided to all PSOs was found, with new starters benefiting from a nationally developed package. The region acknowledged that those with three to five years of experience in practice were where practice gaps were most prevalent. The region was not resourced with training staff under the target operating model, and this was a deficit in enabling the region to drive forward improvement activity.

A learning and development package to support newer PSOs had been developed, which was encouraging, but unlikely to go far enough due to resource constraints. Practitioners who had started their PQiP training told inspectors that their current training had made them realise how unprepared they were when working as PSOs. Those PSOs working in pods felt that additional training, specific to the pod they were working in, would better equip them for the work they were delivering. Using information from other agencies within assessments, and more detailed training on MAPPA, Integrated Offender Management (IOM) and Offender Assessment System (OASys), were all cited as needed by PSOs. The current directive from the centre of not allocating cases while PSOs completed initial training also left some practitioners feeling that the initial training lacked focus or meaning because they could not relate it directly to learning in practice.

The region had a strategy to reduce the impact of street gangs and county lines, although this was not fully formed. It set out work to take place over the next two years, but there was scope to improve understanding of the cohort across the region. Greater internal alignment between IOM, Kent, Surrey and Sussex county lines and urban street gangs board, and the Violence Reduction Unit (VERU) workstreams would have been beneficial. Opportunities also existed to strengthen engagement with youth justice services (YJS) through forums addressing exploitation and contextual safeguarding. While governance arrangements had been set up as part of the internal board, this had yet to coordinate strategically how relevant cases were identified. Police colleagues were likely to have already identified key nominals, and closer linkage was needed. The VERU pod model showed potential in managing young adults, exploitation, and transition cases. However, during our case inspection, not all staff within the VERU pod demonstrated sufficient knowledge or experience to identify county lines or serious organised crime indicators, suggesting a limit to its added value without offering the right training.

The region had seen a rise in MAPPA eligible cases, which mirrored national increases over the last 10 years across all categories and levels. These cases largely required probation officer oversight to contribute to existing resource pressures. It was notable that the inspected MAPPA cases were managed at the correct level and reflected a strong focus on balancing public protection with resourcing challenges, avoiding an excessively risk-averse culture. Practitioners, however, indicated that they felt requesting an escalation to a higher level of management, specifically Level 1 to Level 2, was problematic. Work had been done to address these concerns, with an emphasis on improving referral information from practitioners and clarifying what contribution management at a higher level would bring. Reviewing processes for level one cases had recently changed to a written review mechanism completed by the practitioner holding the case, informed by submissions from other agencies working with the individual. It was too early to ascertain direct findings in terms of impact but would be an area for consideration in any future inspection.

Capacity issues with APs were identified in both weeks of the inspection, compounded by lack of available bed spaces, transfers, co-working arrangements, and contingency measures that were not always effective. The region was concerned about this issue and had pursued conversations with national AP colleagues, which they felt had reached a conclusion but with no resolution. People on probation posing the highest risk of serious harm in Kent, Surrey and Sussex were often refused an AP bed due to capacity issues or placed throughout the country. This contradicted public protection principles of developing stability through support networks and resettlement.

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Regional recommendations (Back to top)

1. ensure that PSOs have sufficient skills, knowledge and experience to adequately assess, plan, work with and review risk of harm to others
2. ensure a strategic approach to identifying street gang and county lines nominals and strengthen strategic relationships, both internally and with partner agencies, to share information and effectively manage these cases.

HMPPS recommendations (Back to top)

3. develop a national strategic approach to information sharing with police and children’s services to support regions in achieving consistency and compliance with legislation to obtain and use information to protect the public
4. reduce vetting delays and address workforce instability by implementing streamlined recruitment processes
5. review AP capacity and placements to support the appropriate management and resettlement of people on probation.

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Scoring (Back to top)

Key question	Percentage ‘Yes’
Does assessment focus sufficiently on keeping other people safe?	41%
Does planning focus sufficiently on keeping other people safe?	57%
Does the implementation and delivery of services effectively support the safety of other people?	46%
Does reviewing focus sufficiently on keeping other people safe?	56%

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Follow-up activity (Back to top)

In line with the recommendations identified, a range of follow-up activity will take place. HM Inspectorate of Probation will work with the region to identify what can be done to guide and support their work, increase knowledge and confidence, and provide a solid foundation for further improvement. The Inspectorate will also seek to share what effective practice looks like by drawing upon inspection findings, identifying blocks to progress, and highlighting opportunities to improve accountability.

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Key contextual facts (Back to top)

Number of people supervised (on 30 June 2025)2	15,158
MAPPA-eligible offenders (on 31 March 2025)3	6,687
Victim satisfaction performance SL021 (April 2024 – March 2025)4	89.8%

Staffing level (Staff in post FTE)5
SPO	PO	PSO (inc. PQiP)
88%	64%	140%

Average caseload at the point of inspection (FTE)
PO	PSO (exc. PQiP)	PQiP
39.95	49.19	22.64

Recall rates (in the 12 months prior to inspection)	23.03%
Average RAR wait time (in the 12 months prior to inspection)	Not available
Percentage of RAR days completed (in the 12 months prior to inspection)	39%
Percentage of accredited programme requirements completed for individuals convicted of a sexual offence (in the 12 months prior to inspection)	27.3%
Percentage of accredited programme requirements completed for individuals not convicted of a sexual offence (in the 12 months prior to inspection)	21.2%

Risk of Serious Harm classification of inspected cases
Low	Medium	High/Very High
7%	55%	34%

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Further information (Back to top)

This inspection was led by HM Inspector Donna Waters, supported by a team of inspectors and colleagues from across the Inspectorate. We would like to thank all those who helped plan and took part in the inspection; without their help and cooperation, the inspection would not have been possible.

Footnotes

1. An operating model to standardise, optimise and transfer sentence management activities to free up practitioner capacity. ↩︎
2. https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/offender-management-statistics-quarterly. ↩︎
3. https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/multi-agency-public-protection-arrangements-mappa-annual-reports. ↩︎
4. https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/community-performance-annual-update-to-march-2025. ↩︎
5. Workforce data included in this report come from internal management information and some of these data have been derived from a different data source to the published HMPPS Workforce Statistics bulletin and accompanying Probation Officer Recruitment Annex. The Inspectorate needs access to the latest data available and internal management information is deemed the best source to allow this. As such, there could be discrepancies between the data in this report and the data contained in the publication. ↩︎